PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

PHIL 272b: TTh 2:30pm-3:45pm in 217A Hall of Graduate Studies (HGS)
Yale University
Spring 2006

Instructor: James Woodbridge
email address: j.woodbridge@yale.edu
Course Webpage: http://pantheon.yale.edu/~jw556/yale/Phil272.htm
Office Hours: TTh 4pm-5:30pm and by appointment
Office: 406B Connecticut Hall
Office Phone: 432-1683
Dept. Phone: 432-1686

TF: Alan Wong
email address: alan.wong@yale.edu
Office Hours: W 2pm-4pm, and by appointment
Office: 103 Connecticut Hall

SECOND PAPER ASSIGNMENT

Pick one of following topics and write a 5-7 page paper fulfilling the tasks assigned.

Your paper is due at the beginning of class on Thursday, April 20th. See the Paper Requirements and Policies handout regarding paper format and related issues.

Topics:

1. In "Can Computers Think?", John Searle argues against what he calls "the Strong AI thesis" by presenting the example of the Chinese Room. Explain the argument he builds around this thought experiment, including how it can be understood as a critique of functionalism. Be sure to discuss how Searle's conclusions depend on making a sharp distinction between syntax and semantics and a view about the special status of the semantic (intentional) aspect of the mental. How do these points work in his replies to responses to his thought experiment. Paul and Patricia Churchland and Daniel Dennett all challenge Searle's "special status" thesis. What are their objections? Do their critiques successfully undercut Searle's position, or can it stand up to them? Are there other considerations that might factor into the debate? Which side in the larger question about AI and functionalism do find more plausible? Explain why.

2. In "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes," Paul Churchland presents a materialist view based on an argument for the elimination of what he calls "Folk Psychology" (FP). The main thesis of the paper is that the basic conceptual categories of FP involve a radical misrepresentation of what cognitive processing involves. Explain and critically evaluate Churchland's argument for this thesis. Donald Davidson and Daniel Dennett present loosely related accounts of FP ("Anomalous Monism" and "The Intentional Strategy") that potentially insulate it from Churchland's eliminativist arguments. Focusing mainly on Davidson's views (but relating Dennett's too) explain the purported aspects of FP that might undercut Churchland's critique. What worries confront the Davidson/Dennett approach? Who do you think comes out with the most plausible view about the mental? Support your assessment.

3. Physicalists/materialists hold that all facts (including those about "mental" states) are physical facts. If this is right, then the only facts there are to know are physical facts. Briefly explain how Thomas Nagel challenges this thesis. Along the same lines, Frank Jackson offers the Knowledge Argument (concerning Black-and-White Mary) against the idea that a physicalist (including functionalist) view can account for all there is to the mental. In your own words, explain this scenario and the connected argument. Next, explain Paul Churchland's objection to the argument and discuss his account of the scenario. Then explain Jackson's response to Churchland. Who do you think has the better argument here? Has Jackson shown that no physicalist theory can account for qualia, or has Churchland shown that physicalism is still a live option, as we currently have no good argument against it? Support your view here with reasons.