PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

PHIL 272b: TTh 2:30pm-3:45pm in 217A Hall of Graduate Studies (HGS)
Yale University
Spring 2006

Instructor: James Woodbridge
email address: j.woodbridge@yale.edu
Course Webpage: http://pantheon.yale.edu/~jw556/yale/Phil272.htm
Office Hours: TTh 4pm-5:30pm and by appointment
Office: 406B Connecticut Hall
Office Phone: 432-1683
Dept. Phone: 432-1686

TF: Alan Wong
email address: alan.wong@yale.edu
Office Hours: W 2pm-4pm, and by appointment
Office: 103 Connecticut Hall

FIRST PAPER ASSIGNMENT

Pick one of following topics and write a 5-7 page paper fulfilling the tasks assigned.

Your paper is due at the beginning of class on Tuesday, February 21st. See the Paper Requirements and Policies handout regarding paper format and related issues.

Topics:

1. Mental/Physical Dualism claims that the mental and the physical are entirely distinct--two separate domains. Starting with the sort of dualism Descartes believed in, discuss the main tenets of this position. What sort of reasons can be given for believing in dualism? The main problem this position faces comes from the idea of mental causation. What is mental causation? Give examples. Why do we think this is an important notion? Explain the ways that it is problematic on the dualist picture as laid out so far. Again, use examples. Discuss the way that dualism gets modified by Jacquette in an attempt to avoid Descartes' problem with mental causation. What is the relation between the version of dualism Jacquette presents and the first version? Why might one think that this modified dualism avoids the problem? Do this really solve the problem of mental causation? If so, how? If not, why not?

2. The Mind/Brain Identity Theory (IT) claims that all mental states or events are physical states or events. Explain what kind of identity thesis IT involves. Relate this to the idea of reduction, explaining what reduction involves and what its role is in IT. Kripke offers an argument against IT on the basis of the necessity of theoretical identities. Explain why he thinks this creates a problem for IT (you do not have to cover why Kripke maintains the necessity of true theoretical identity claims). What is the crucial thesis about the mental state of pain that Kripke relies on in running his argument? Give examples to illustrate the different ways Kripke thinks the problem arises for IT's identity claim. What might an Identity Theorist say in reply? Do you think that IT has an adequate reply to Kripke's objection? Why or why not?

3. One of the most attractive features of functionalism is that it characterizes mental states as "multiply realizable". Explain what this means and how the basic ideas behind a functionalist account of mental states give them this feature. Why is this considered a good aspect of the view, that is, what problem does it avoid? (It might help to contrast the Identity Theory here). While most philosophers have considered multiple-realizability a good feature of functionalism, Ned Block argues that, in the extreme, it can saddle functionalism with a different problem--liberalism. What is this problem, and how does it arise for functionalism? Discuss an example while explaining this. What might a functionalist say in response to this problem? Do you think liberalism threatens all versions of functionalism? Is there any unproblematic move within functionalism (broadly speaking) that could avoid this problem? If you think so, explain what it is; if you think not, explain why not.