Instructor: James Woodbridge
email address: jawoo2@wm.edu
Office Hours: T 10am-11:30am, W 4:30pm-5:30pm,
and by appointment
Office: 126 Blair Hall
Office Phone: 221-2713
Dept. Phone: 221-2735

SECOND PAPER ASSIGNMENT

Pick one of the topics below and write a 7-9 page paper completing the tasks assigned.

Your paper is due in my hand or in my mailbox at the Philosopy Dept. by 5pm, Friday, December 6th.

Topics:

1. In “Possible Worlds” and On the Plurality of Worlds (pp. 1-20), Lewis presents his Extreme Modal Realism regarding the notion of possible worlds. Explain the basic ideas of Lewis's view (Stalnaker's "Possible Worlds" can help here), then explain how it is a consequence of his position that nothing exists in more than one possible world. What does Lewis offer instead with his Counterpart Theory? Briefly explain what he means when he says that Counterpart Theory is needed to provide more to quantify over than just possible worlds in order to account for de re modal attributions of essential and contingent properties. (See pp. 9-10 of OTPOW, but pp. 10-12 present some worries. The selection from Naming and Necessity by Kripke can help on de re modality.) The thesis of worldbound individuals (WBI) is also supposed to help with the Problem of Transworld Identification. Explain this problem and how Counterpart Theory is supposed to help with it (see the Kripke and Plantinga's "Transworld Identity or Worldbound Individuals?"). Do you think it does, or does it create more problems than it solves? Explain. What does Plantinga say about this? Explain how he thinks we should deal with the Problem of Transworld Identification, and what he thinks of Counterpart Theory. Do you think Extreme Modal Realism and Counterpart Theory are a defensible approach in accounting for modality, or are there substantial (i.e., more than simply aesthetic) objections to Lewis's view? Do you accept his account of modality, or do you prefer another account? Support your choice by giving reasons for favoring it.


2. In Section III of “Putnam’s Pragmatic Realism,” Sosa discusses a metaphysical issue regarding the existence and endurance through time (“perdurance”) of “constituted, supervenient” entities, that is, objects thought of on a “broadly Aristotelian” model as constituted by combinations of sorts of constituent matter and constituent forms. (Sosa gives the example of thinking of a snowball as being constituted by a type of stuff—snow—having a particular form—roundness.) The very existence as well as the perdurance of such entities is supposed to be a matter of certain criteria being satisfied. In your own words, using your own examples, explain this Aristotelian picture of the existence and perdurance of constituted entities. Next, using further examples, discuss the problem of “explosion” that arises. Sosa claims that we are left with three options in the face of this result: Absolutism, Eliminativism, and Conceptual Relativism. Summarize (in your own words) the basic ideas behind each response to explosion, including the central problems each faces. (You might bring in Putnam's discussion of essentialism and other points from "Why There Isn't a Ready-Made World," along with what Devitt says about constructivism in "A Naturalistic Defense of Realism".) Are these responses, as Sosa claims, the only options here? Specifically, is Devitt's "common-sense realism" an alternative? (Relate his view to the options Sosa offers. Are there any problems specific to Devitt's view?) Which response do you think is the most plausible? Give reasons (of your own) for picking the option you choose, and discuss how you would deal with the problems your favored response faces.