Instructor: James Woodbridge
email address: jawoo2@wm.edu
Office Hours: T 10am-11:30am, W 4:30pm-5:30pm,
and by appointment
Office: 126 Blair Hall
Office Phone: 221-2713
Dept. Phone: 221-2735

FIRST PAPER ASSIGNMENT

Pick one of the topics below and write a 7-9 page paper completing the tasks assigned.

Your paper is due at the beginning of class (i.e., do not come late and do not skip class to finish, as the paper is already late) on Wednesday, October 30th.

Topics:

1. In “Against ‘Ostrich’ Nominalism: A Reply to Michael Devitt”, Armstrong claims that the phenomenon of sameness of type presents a mandatory philosophical question requiring a substantial answer. In offering his answer (here and in “Universals as Attributes”), he appeals to the “one over many” argument, claiming that a sufficient explanation will involve accepting the existence of universals. Explain the basic idea behind this line of reasoning (using your own example). What is the biggest problem facing realism about universals? In “On What There Is,” Quine offers a criterion of ontological commitment and then relies on this criterion in rejecting the existence of universals. Briefly, explain the general idea behind the criterion and how it factors into Quine’s rejection of the “one over many” argument. Armstrong claims that Quine’s reasoning involves a refusal to explain sameness of type. What are his grounds for claiming this? Be sure to factor in Devitt’s elaboration of Quine’s rejection, and Armstrong’s response to Devitt’s claim that the sort of situation cited in the “one over many” argument can be explained trivially. Is Armstrong right that sameness of type is still unaddressed, or can Quine respond? In any case, what additional problem (acknowledged by Devitt as well as Armstrong) does the Quinean view face according to its own criteria? In the end, who do you think has the better account of the similarities we note between different things, Armstrong or Quine? Explain why.

2. In “Three Versions of the Bundle Theory,” Van Cleve offers 6 objections to the view that particulars are nothing but bundles of properties. He focuses on versions that take properties to be universals. Briefly explain the problems he sees with bundle theories. What is the main alternative to the bundle theory? What problems does it face? (You might appeal to the Allaire-Chappell debate here.) In “The Metaphysics of Abstract Particulars,” Campbell offers a version of the bundle theory that takes properties to be tropes--particular property-instances. What are the basic details of this view of properties and the resulting account of particulars? How does the Trope Bundle Theory fare with respect to Van Cleve’s 6 objections? (Simons’ discussion might be of use here.) Van Cleve briefly mentions the Trope Bundle Theory, only to reject it quickly. Is his objection telling? What about Simons’ more detailed worries, especially concerning the central notion of compresence? In the end, do you think the Trope Bundle Theory is a satisfactory account of particulars? Why or why not?