METAPHYSICS

PHIL 441, Sec. 1001: MW 11:30pm-12:45pm in BEH 127
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Fall 2023



Professor: James Woodbridge
email address:
Course Webpage: http://faculty.unlv.edu/jwood/unlv/Phil441F23.htm
Office Hours:  M 2:30pm-4pm, T 12:30pm-2pm, and by appointment
Office: CDC 426
Dept. Phone: 895-3433

FIRST PAPER

Pick one of following topics and write a 6-8 page/2000-2600 word paper fulfilling the tasks assigned.
Do not use any outside sources: just the course readings and discussion, and your own thinking.

Your paper is due via WebCampus/Canvas, through the Turnitin.com program linked to the Assignment listing there, before class (11:30am) on Monday 10/16. The file that you submit for your paper must be an MS-Word file (.doc or .docx or .docm) and should have the following format for its filename: yourstudentnumber.PHIL441F23.paper1.docx. Your name should not appear anywhere on your paper. If you do not use Word you must convert your file to a Word file before submitting it to Turnitin.com.

Topics:

1. Both Quine and Carnap are prime examples of 20th-Century empiricists (or empirically oriented philosophers), and as such both reject traditional, a priori, speculative metaphysics as illegitimate. Quine, however, appears to endorse a different kind of metaphysical inquiry, at least in so far as the enterprise of ontology is concerned. Explain how this so-called "naturalistic" approach to metaphysics is supposed to differ from "traditional" metaphysics. In doing so, provide details about Quine's understanding of how one can legitimately engage in ontological inquiry--how we can attempt to figure out what kinds of things exist. This relies in particular on the criterion of ontological commitment he lays out in "On What There Is" (pp. 42-56). Be sure to explain accurately what "criterion of ontological commitment" means in general, and then specifically what Quine's criterion is. Then explain the relationship between Quine's criterion of ontological commitment and his view of ontological inquiry. (This involves being very clear about how one uses the former in the service of doing the latter. Using an example might help make things clear.) Next, consider Carnap's position on ontology and ontological inquiry, as expressed in "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" (online). Explain the distinction he draws between internal and external questions about existence, being clear about the different kinds of criteria involved in answering different types (e.g., about numbers vs. about planets) and different kinds (internal vs. external) of existence questions. What are the similarities and differences between how Carnap says existence questions are to be assessed and answered and how Quine says we should assess and answer them? Explain Carnap's views regarding the possibility of specifically ontological inquiry, even on a naturalistic approach, and his reasons for having them. Which of these philosophers' positions on ontology and ontological inquiry do you find superior? Explain why. (Quine's "On Carnap's Views on Ontology" (WebCampus) could be relevant here. No cop-outs on this: argue for one view over the other.)


2. Universals are a theoretical posit in a certain philosophical explanation of the phenomenon of recurrence/resemblance/similarity across different concrete particulars (or "substances"). Briefly summarize how an appeal to universals functions in an account of resemblance or sameness between particulars. However, positing universals, as an additional fundamental category of entity, on top of the category of particulars, raises a variety of questions. One such is how the two different kinds of entities, universals and particulars/substances, get together to yield particulars with properties/characteristics (or pairs, triples, etc. of particulars in relations with one another). Armstrong refers to this as the issue of "the fundamental tie" or "nexus" of instantiation. Is an appeal to the notion of instantiation an adequate answer to this question? Explain the regress worry that confronts at least a Russellian/Platonic ante rem view of universals. Price seems to suggest that moving to an in rebus view of universals is sufficient to dissolve worries about instantiation (pp. 23-25). Is he right about this, or is the question still live? Explain. Next, discuss briefly the ways that Resemblance Nominalism and Trope Theory are supposed to avoid the "combination" issue by each positing only one fundamental category of entity (just concrete particulars and just tropes/abstract particulars, respectively). Can they claim an advantage over Universals Theory here? Explain the putative "regress" or hierarchy worries that these views face, in virtue of their reliance on a notion of primitive resemblance, while denying it is a universal. (See Price, pp. 34-35.) Are these supposed regresses as problematic as the instantiation regress? Why or why not? Armstrong claims that his recognition of yet another category of entities--states of affairs (of which particulars and in rebus universals are constituents)--seems to be able to block an instantiation regress. How is this supposed to work? Does it do the trick? Focusing on the issues you have discussed in your paper, which account of the phenomenon of recurrence/resemblance--Universals Theory, Resemblance Nominalism, or Trope Theory--comes out best overall? Back up your choice with reasons (in particular, explain what criteria of theory choice you are applying and how they favor one theory over the others).


Be sure to look at my Paper Requirements and Policies.

Keep your paper within the page/word limit!