Philosophy of Science: Second Paper Topics

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

PHIL 430, Sec. 1001: MW 11:30am-12:45pm in WRI C212
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Spring 2026

Professor: James Woodbridge
email address:
Course Webpage: http://jwood.faculty.unlv.edu/unlv/Phil430S26.htm
Office Hours: M 1:30pm-3pm, T 12:30pm-2pm, and by appointment
Office: CDC 426
Dept. Phone: 895-3433

SECOND PAPER
Pick one of following topics and write a 6-8 page/2000-2500 word paper fulfilling the tasks assigned.

Your paper is due via WebCampus, through the Turnitin.com program linked to the Assignment listing there, by 11:59pm, Sunday 5/3. The file that you submit for your paper must be an MS-Word file (.doc, .docx, or .docm) and should have the following format for its filename: yourstudentnumber.PHIL430S26.paper2.docx. Your name should not appear anywhere on your paper.
Use no resources other than the assigned readings and your own notes and thinking to write this paper. This includes a total prohibition on using any generative AI programs--even just Grammarly, etc. to "clean up my writing". Violating the course's zero-tolerance policy on this front is grounds for failure of the entire course.

Topics:

1. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn criticizes traditional views about observation and scientific methodology. What are these traditional views and what alternative understandings does Kuhn offer? Be sure to explain the reasons he gives for his claims. Kuhn's views on these matters (especially on observation--see Godfrey-Smith, Chapter 9, pp. 203-209, on this) are the basis for certain radical conclusions he draws (mainly in Ch. X) about the results of paradigm change and, consequently, the nature of progress in science. Explain what he thinks about these issues, being sure to cover how he derives his conclusions. In "On the Current Status of the Issue of Scientific Realism," Richard Boyd claims that Kuhn's anti-realist conclusions are not the only ones it is possible to draw from his understanding of observation and scientific methodology. What alternative conclusions does Boyd propose, and what are his reasons for drawing them? If we accept Kuhn's views on observation and methodology, who should we side with about science in general, Kuhn or Boyd? (Godfrey-Smith, Chapter 5, pp. 118-129 and Chapter 10 can help here.) Support your position on this issue.

2. In "Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism" (and "To Save the Phenomena"), Bas van Fraassen offers an understanding of science he calls "Constructive Empiricism" (CE). How does this view differ from the earlier empiricist view, Logical Empiricism (LE), and how is it related to Scientific Realism (SR)? As an empiricist, van Fraassen appeals to an underdetermination (or evidential indistinguishability) thesis in arguing that the most we can rationally strive for in scientific inquiry is empirically adequate theories. What does he mean by this, and how does this argument proceed? (Boyd, pp. 46-48 and Godfrey-Smith, Chapter 10, pp. 229-233, 237-239, might help here.) Explain how van Fraassen's conclusion relies on an observable/unobservable distinction. How does he understand and support this distinction? Is the distinction, as he understands it, viable? (Again, compare Boyd, pp. 49-51, and Godfrey-Smith, pp. 231-233. Also consider Fine, "And Not Anti-Realism Either," pp. 57-60.) If so, should we agree with van Fraassen about science? If the distinction is not viable, what understanding of science should we adopt instead of CE? Give reasons supporting your views here.

3. In "On the Current Status of the Issue of Scientific Realism," Richard Boyd offers an argument for Scientific Realism (SR) that he claims succeeds where earlier ones failed. How did these earlier realist responses to empiricist and constructivist critiques ultimately fail on his view? Explain Boyd's new argument for SR, being sure to cover how it differs in focus from earlier ones (see van Fraassen, "Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism," pp. 37-40, and Godfrey-Smith, Chapter 10, pp. 223-228) and why he thinks it avoids their weaknesses. Next, consider the type of reasoning or argumentative strategy Boyd employs in his argument for SR. In "The Natural Ontological Attitude," Arthur Fine criticizes the use of this sort of strategy in arguing for SR. What is it, according to Fine, that makes Boyd's argument problematic? How does Boyd respond to Fine's critique? (See Boyd, pp. 72-75 and bottom of 79-top of 83, in particular.) Does Fine's criticism show that SR is unjustified, or does Boyd defend his argument and view adequately? Give reasons for your assessment.