PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE
PHIL 425, Sec. 1001: MW 1pm-2:15pm in CBC C146
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Spring 2022
Professor: James Woodbridge
email address:
Course Webpage: http://jwood.faculty.unlv.edu/unlv/Phil425S22.htm
Office Hours: T 12:30pm-2pm, W 2:30pm-4pm, and by appointment
Office: CDC 426
Office Phone: 895-4051
Dept. Phone: 895-3433
SECOND PAPER
Pick one of following topics and write a 6-8 page/2000-2500 word paper fulfilling the tasks assigned.
Do not use any outside sources: just the course readings and discussion, and your own thinking.
Your paper is due via WebCampus-Canvas, through the Turnitin.com program linked to the Assignment listing, by midnight, Sunday 5/1. The file that you send me for your paper should have the following format for its filename: yourstudentnumber.PHIL425S22.paper2.docx. So that I can grade “blind”, your name should not appear anywhere on your paper. Finally, you must submit a .docx (or .doc or .docm) file (i.e., not a PDF) so that I can use Word to make comments on it. If you do not use Word, you must convert your file to this format before submitting it.
Topics:
1. Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam separately develop what is typically called "externalism" about semantics. As Putnam puts the point, "meanings [specifically, intensions, i.e., the aspect of linguistic expressions that determines their extensions] just ain't in the head!" Summarize their arguments for their externalist views by discussing the following. Kripke first argues (in Naming and Necessity) against a Frege-Russell-based descriptivism about proper names, such as "Einstein", and then offers an alternative account of how names refer. Summarize his main arguments against descriptivism, then explain his alternative picture of how names pick out their bearers. (Kemp, Ch. 5 can help here.) Why should we call this alternative "externalism"? Putnam presents his arguments by considering how natural kind terms, such as "water", operate in referring to their extensions, using his famous "Twin Earth" considerations (in "Meaning and Reference") to conclude that this is not a matter of the what the speaker is thinking when she uses the expression. Summarize this argument and then explain the factors Putnam thinks are involved in natural kind terms getting their extensions. (Kemp, Ch. 6 can help here.) Why should we call this account "externalism"? This externalist perspective seems to contrast with the view of language as "I-language" that Noam Chomsky presents (in PPL, Ch. 1) and the view of word meanings stemming from this that Paul Elbourne favors (in Meaning, Ch. 2). What are some of their reasons for thinking that meanings (again, specifically intensions, i.e., the aspect of language that determines the extensions of expressions) are in the head? Overall, which view of meaning is most plausible, the externalist or the internalist? Support your conclusion here with reasons.
2. One important principle of semantics is compositionality. Explain what this principle claims about meaning and why theorists have thought it is important. As Kemp points out (in his "Introduction"), Gottlob Frege accepts compositionality about his notion of sense (in addition to accepting it about reference, aka semantic-value, since that is the basis of his predicate logic). So, for Frege, the meaning of a sentence (its sense) is compositional. Explain how this is supposed to work on Frege's view for a sentence like 'Rufus is afraid of thunder' and provide a meaning specification in terms of a sense (or Fregean thought) expressed. Why does this make the sense of a sentence its truth-conditions for Frege? (Kemp, Ch. 2 can help here.) Donald Davidson argues (in PPL, Ch. 4.), that applying compositionality to Frege's notion of sense does not explain what sentences mean. What is his reasoning here? (Kemp, Ch. 9 can help on this.) Interestingly, Davidson agrees with Frege that meaning is compositional and that a sentence's meaning is its truth-conditions. Explain how he (Davidson) underwrites these ideas about meaning, by laying out his reasons for concluding that we can take a Tarski truth-definition for a language as a theory of meaning for that language. (Skip the technical details of how a Tarski truth-definition works; describing certain features it has is sufficient.) Be sure to explain why Davidson thinks a theory of meaning has to be extensional. (Cite the Davidson, but Kemp, Ch. 9 can help here as well.) What form, then, would Davidson say a specification of the meaning of the English sentence 'Rufus is afraid of thunder' should take? Explain the worry about deviant "meaning specifications" that arises and what its basis is. (See Soames, "Truth, Meaning, and Understanding" and Kemp, Ch. 9.) Explain Davidson's application of an appeal to "holism" in his attempt to block this worry. Do you agree with Davidson that a Tarski truth-definition that meets certain constraints can serve as a theory of meaning for the language, or do you think we need to move back to an approach more like Frege's? Support your conclusion here with reasons.
Be sure to look at my Paper Requirements and Policies and check this Numbered Writing Comments Sheet to be aware of various writing infelicities that you should avoid.
Keep your paper within the page limit!