LANGUAGE AND MIND
PHIL 345, Sec. 001: TTh 11:30am-1pm in 3437 Mason Hall
The University of Michigan
Winter 2005
Instructor: James Woodbridge
email address: jwood@umich.edu
Course Webpage: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~jwood/umich/Phil345.htm
Office Hours: T 2pm-3:30pm, W 1pm-2pm, and by appointment
Office: 2200 Angell Hall
Office Phone: 615-6537
Dept. Phone: 764-6285
SECOND PAPER ASSIGNMENT
Pick one of
following topics and write a 4-6 page paper fulfilling the tasks
assigned.
Your paper is due at the beginning of class (11:30am) on Tuesday, April 19th.
Topics:
1. One of the most attractive features of functionalism is that it characterizes mental states as "multiply realizable". Explain what this means and how the basic ideas behind a functionalist account of mental states give them this feature.
Why is this considered a good aspect of the view, that is, what problem does it avoid? (It might help to contrast the identity theory here). While most philosophers have considered multiple-realizability a good feature of functionalism, Ned
Block argues that, in the extreme, it can saddle functionalism with a different problem--liberalism. What is this problem, and how does it arise for functionalism? Discuss an example while explaining this. What might a functionalist say in
response to this problem? Do you think liberalism threatens all versions of functionalism? Is there any unproblematic move within functionalism (broadly speaking) that could avoid this problem? If you think so, explain what it is; if you think
not, explain why not. Throughout this paper, explain things in your own words as much as you can.
2. One of the major challenges to functionalism about mental states has to do with the qualitative or phenomenal aspect of some of our mental states--those constituting our conscious experience. What is it about so-called "qualia" and the way
functionalism understands mental states (explain this) that makes the former a problem for the latter? A further issue is that most functionalists are also physicalists/materialists and therefore hold that all facts (including those about mental
states) are physical facts. If this is right, then the only facts there are to know are physical facts. Frank Jackson offers the Knowledge Argument (concerning Black-and-White Mary) against the idea that a physicalist (including functionalist)
view can account for all there is to the mental. In your own words, explain this scenario and the connected argument. Next, explain Paul Churchland's objection to the argument and discuss his account of the scenario. Then explain Jackson's response
to Churchland. Who do you think has the better argument here? Has Jackson shown that no physicalist theory can account for qualia, or has Churchland shown that physicalism is still a live option, as we currently have no good argument against
it? Support your view here with reasons.
You should use only your own brains, class notes, and the course textbook in writing this paper.