PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
V83.0080-001
Tuesdays and Thursdays 2:50pm-4:05pm in 721 Main Building
New York University
Fall 1999

Instructor: James Woodbridge
email address: jw79@is9.nyu.edu
Office Hours: Th 4:10pm-6:10pm
Office: Main Building 503H
Office Phone: 998-3546
Dept. Phone: 998-8320


SECOND PAPER ASSIGNMENT

Pick one of following topics and write a 6-10 page paper fulfilling the tasks assigned.

Your paper is due in my office Thursday, December 16th by 4pm (I will be in my office from 3pm to 4pm).

Topics:

1. In "Troubles with Functionalism," Ned Block distinguishes two kinds of functionalism and offers the Absent Qualia Argument against a functionalist analysis of the mental. What is supposed about qualia and about the functionalist approach to the mental that makes the former seem like such a problem for the latter? Explain how Block’s argument is supposed to work for each type of functionalism, noting the relevant differences in the two cases (note: there is more to the Absent Qualia Argument than just the Absent Qualia Intuition about certain cases). Critically evaluate the arguments, and consider possible replies a functionalist might make to them. Are there any available responses that manage to protect either version (or both) of functionalism against Block’s objections, or do his arguments succeed in showing that a functionalist account of the mental is inadequate?

2. In "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes," Paul Churchland presents a materialist view based on an argument for the elimination of what he calls "Folk Psychology" (FP). The main thesis of the paper is that the basic conceptual categories of FP involve a radical misrepresentation of what cognitive processing involves. Explain Churchland’s argument for this thesis. Situate Churchland’s Eliminative Materialism (EM) with respect to other theories of the mental that we have examined by considering how his main thesis bears on them. Critically evaluate the argument for elimination, considering replies that might be given to it. Do you think the argument works, or do any replies manage to block it?

3. David Chalmers claims that consciousness cannot be explained reductively. What does he mean by this, that is, exactly what, according to him, escapes the reductive net (and what can be caught by it)? In "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness" and Chapter 3 of The Conscious Mind, Chalmers explains why he thinks there can be no reductive explanation of consciousness. Reconstruct his reasoning, being sure to cover the different stages of the argument. Evaluate his reasons. Are there any responses that can be made to them? What further conclusions about the mental does Chalmers draw from his views about consciousness? Explain what kind of view of the mental his arguments point to at this stage, and how this kind of view fares with respect to his main objection to putative reductive accounts of consciousness. Is this a satisfying view of the mental? Why or why not?