PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
V83.0080-001
Tuesdays and Thursdays 2:50pm-4:05pm in 721 Main Building
New York University
Fall 1999

Instructor: James Woodbridge
email address: jw79@is9.nyu.edu
Office Hours: Th 4:10pm-6:10pm
Office: Main Building 503H
Office Phone: 998-3546
Dept. Phone: 998-8320


FIRST PAPER ASSIGNMENT

Pick one of following topics and write a 6-10 page paper fulfilling the tasks assigned.

Your paper is due in my office Friday, October 29th by 4pm.

Topics:

1. Mental/Physical Dualism claims that the mental and the physical are entirely distinct--two separate domains. Starting with the sort of dualism Descartes believed in, discuss the main tenets of this position. What sort of reasons can be given for believing in dualism? The main problem this position faces comes from the idea of mental causation. What is mental causation? Given examples. Why do we think this is an important notion? Explain the ways that it is problematic on the dualist picture as laid out so far. Again, use examples. Discuss the way that dualism gets modified in an attempt to avoid Descartes’ problem with mental causation. What is the relation between this version of dualism and the first version? Why might one think that this modified dualism avoids the problem? Discuss the different versions of this understanding of dualism. Do any of them really solve the problem of mental causation? If so, how? If not, why not?

2. The Mind/Brain Identity Theory claims that all mental states or events are physical states or events. This claim can be understood in a weak way and in a strong way. Explain the difference and why Identity Theory is best thought of in terms of one and not the other. Next, discuss the idea of reduction. Explain how it is supposed to work and its role in the Identity Theory. In "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" Thomas Nagel poses a problem for the Identity Theory that results from its commitment to the reducibility of the mental. Explain what he says about the aim of reduction, and discuss the contrast Nagel draws between standard cases of reduction (give an example) and reduction in the case of the mental (a certain aspect of it at least). Why does Nagel claim that the aim of reduction cannot be attained, in fact, it does not even make sense, in the case of the mental? What might an Identity Theorist say in reply? Do you think that this response is adequate? Why or why not?

3. Functionalism is a view based on the idea that mental properties and states are "multiply realizable." Briefly, explain this idea, that is, explain what mental states amount to on a functionalist picture. Illustrate by comparing this to functional accounts of other properties (e.g., the property of being a gene or of being a carburetor, etc.). One implication of functionalism is that a digital computer running an appropriate program would have genuine mental states and properties; Artificial Intelligence (AI) would be possible. Explain why this follows from a functionalist view of mentality. In "Computing Machinery and Intelligence," Alan Turing proposes the famous Turing Test for determining whether a computer has genuine intelligence. How is this test supposed to work? Given what it says is a sufficient condition for having mentality, what view of mentality does Turing seem to assume? In "Minds, Brains, and Programs," John Searle argues against the possibility of AI and criticizes the Turing Test as failing to offer a sufficient condition for mentality. Briefly describe his argument and explain how it amounts to a rejection of the Turing Test. What do you think of the Turing Test, and why? Do you think Searle has shown that a digital computer could never have genuine mentality? Support your opinion.