Instructor: James Woodbridge
email address: jw79@nyu.edu
Office Hours: M 5pm-6pm, Th 10am-11am
Office: Main Building 503-O
Office Phone: 998-8330
Dept. Phone: 998-8320

SECOND PAPER ASSIGNMENT

Pick one of the topics below and write a 4-6 page paper completing the tasks assigned.

Your paper is due in my office or mailbox no later than 3pm on Monday, June 25th.

Topics:

1. The "one over many" argument attempts to establish the existence of universals on the basis of our describing different things as alike. Explain the basic idea behind the argument (using your own example). In "On What There Is," Quine offers a criterion of ontological commitment--a way of determining what kinds of things one is committed to the existence of on the basis of his or her talk. Quine then relies on this criterion in rejecting the existence of universals. Briefly, explain the general idea behind the criterion and how it factors into Quine's rejection of the "one over many" argument. Armstrong claims that Quine's reasoning involves a refusal to answer a mandatory philosophical question: explaining sameness of type. What are his grounds for claiming this? Be sure to factor in Devitt's elaboration of Quine's rejection, and Armstrong's response to his claim that the sort of situation cited in the "one over many" argument can be explained trivially. Is Armstrong right that the problem is still unaddressed? Is there anything Quine (and Devitt) could say in reply to Armstrong? Do you think in the end that there is a genuine problem being addressed by the "one over many" argument? Why or why not?

2. In "Three Versions of the Bundle Theory," Van Cleve offers 6 objections to the view that particulars are bundles of properties. He focuses on versions that take properties to be universals. But in "The Metaphysics of Abstract Particulars," Campbell offers a version of the bundle theory that takes properties to be tropes--particular property-instances. What are the basic details of this view? How does the Trope Bundle Theory fare with respect to Van Cleve's 6 objections? (Simons' discussion might be of use here.) Van Cleve briefly mentions the Trope Bundle Theory, only to reject it quickly. Is his objection telling? What about Simons more detailed worries, especially concerning the central notion of compresence? In the end, do you think the Trope Bundle Theory is a satisfactory account of particulars? Why or why not?