Instructor: James Woodbridge
email address: jw79@is9.nyu.edu
Office Hours: Tuesday 11am-12pm, 2:30pm-3:30pm
Office: Main Building 503-O
Office Phone: 998-8330
Dept. Phone: 998-8320
TA: Chris Towl
Email: cst211@is9.nyu.edu
Pick one of following topics and write a 4-6 page paper fulfilling
the tasks assigned.
Your paper is due at the beginning of class on Tuesday, November 14th.
Topics:
1. In Meditations I and II from Meditations on First Philosophy, René Descartes
attempt to find out what beliefs, if any, can serve as a foundation in a system
of knowledge that can resist skepticism. Explain the relevant sort of system of
knowledge, what a belief must be like to serve as part of the foundation, and
why. What method does Descartes come up with in Meditation I to see which beliefs
can and which cannot go into the foundation? The point here is to talk about the
method and explain how it works in your own words, not to employ it yourself.
What are some of the kinds of beliefs the method rules out? Give examples of how.
In one of the most important moments in western philosophy, Descartes claims in
Meditation II to find a belief that can go into the foundation of his system of
knowledge. What belief is this? What is it about this belief that is supposed
to allow it to resist elimination by the method from Meditation I? Explain how
this is supposed to work. Do not simply paraphrase what Descartes says. Do you
think that his reasoning here works, or are there problems with it? Do not just
give your opinion on this--support your answer with reasons. (The on-line reading
by Russell might help.)
2. In Section IV of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, David Hume
presents a problem regarding certain beliefs about matters of fact. This problem
has come to be known as The Problem of Induction. The principle being called into
question is in fact the basis of most of our common sense and scientific beliefs.
Explain in your own words which specific class of common sense and scientific
beliefs is problematized, what the problem is, and how it supposedly arises. (See
p. 197.) Hume considers a natural-seeming reply that a defender of common sense
and science might make, but explains why this reply cannot block the problem.
What is the reply, and why doesn't it work? In Section V, Hume offers what he
calls a "skeptical solution" to The Problem of Induction. He claims
that we should not reject our ordinary practice of forming expectations about
the future on the basis of our experience. On what claim about inductive inference
is his position based? What dimension or aspect of inductive inference does Hume's
"solution" address directly? Does it deal with the central problem that
concerns him? If you think it does, explain how. If you think it does not, is
there anything more that can be said in support of induction than what Hume offers?